Abstract-A private information retrieval (PIR) scheme is a mechanism that allows a user to retrieve any one out of K messages from N non-communicating replicated databases, each of which stores all K messages, without revealing anything (in the information theoretic sense) about the identity of the desired message index to any individual database. If the size of each message is L bits and the total download required by a PIR scheme from all N databases is D bits, then D is called the download cost and the ratio L/ D is called an achievable rate. For fixed K, N ∈ N, the capacity of PIR, denoted by C, is the supremum of achievable rates over all PIR schemes and over all message sizes, and was recently shown to be C = Index Terms-Private information retrieval, download cost, capacity, finite message length.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I N THE private information retrieval (PIR) problem [1] , [2] , we have K messages, stored at N distributed and non-communicating databases. A PIR scheme allows a user to retrieve any one of the K messages, while revealing no information to any individual database (even if the database has unbounded computation power) about the retrieved message index. Typical quality measures of PIR schemes include communication complexity [1] - [7] , computational overhead [8] - [10] , storage overhead [11] - [19] , upload cost, download cost [11] , [12] , [14] , [18] , [20] , and rate [14] , [18] , [20] . In this work we will focus on download cost and rate. If the size of each message is L bits and the total download required by a PIR scheme from all N databases is D bits, then D is called the download cost and the ratio L/D is called an achievable rate. The capacity of PIR, denoted by C, is defined to be the supremum of achievable rates over all PIR schemes and over all message sizes. It was shown recently in [20] 
The reciprocal of capacity, 1/C, similarly represents the infimum of download cost per message bit over all PIR schemes and over all message sizes. Fundamental information theoretic measures such as these are essentially asymptotic in character, involving limits as message lengths L → ∞.
Remarkably, [20] shows that these asymptotically optimal values are also achieved exactly when the message length parameter L is any integer multiple of N K . However, since in practice the message length parameter L can be arbitrary, an important question that remains open is to determine optimal download cost and rate values for arbitrary fixed values of L, in particular when L is not an integer multiple of N K . In this work, we explore the minimum download cost across all PIR schemes (not restricted to linear schemes) for arbitrary message lengths under arbitrary choices of alphabet (not restricted to finite fields) for the message and download symbols. If the same M-ary alphabet is used for the message and download symbols, then we show that the optimal download cost in M-ary symbols is D L = L C . If the message symbols are in M-ary alphabet and the downloaded symbols are in M -ary alphabet, then we show that the optimal download cost in M -ary symbols, 
For a permutation function λ(·) applied to some l-tuple U = (U (1), U (2), · · · , U (l)), we will allow some abuse of notation to write
λ(U ) = (U (λ(1)), U (λ(2)), · · · , U (λ(l))).
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
There are K messages W 1 , · · · , W K , each of which is an arbitrary string of length L comprised of M-ary symbols.
Note that there are M L possible distinct realizations of each message. Note that message realizations are arbitrary, i.e., we do not enforce any statistical assumption on the message symbols.
There are N databases. Each database stores all the messages
Depending upon the desired message index θ ∈ [1 : K ], the user follows one of K strategies. These strategies are specified in terms of K N random queries, Q [θ] n , ∀n ∈ [1 : N], ∀θ ∈ [1 : K ] that are privately generated by the user a-priori, i.e., without any knowledge of the message realizations. In order to retrieve W θ , the user sends the query Q [θ] n to the n-th database, ∀n ∈ [1 : N]. Upon receiving Q [θ] n , the n-th database returns an answering string A [θ] n , which is a function of Q [θ] n and the data stored (i.e., messages
n | . From all the information that is now available to the user ( A
[1:N] ), he must be able to correctly decode the desired message W θ . That is, the following correctness constraint must be satisfied.
[Correctness] W θ is a deterministic function of
To protect the user's privacy, the query presented to each database must be identically distributed regardless of the desired message index. (4) Note that the databases do not collude so that the privacy constraint (4) is specified with respect to each individual database.
The download cost, D, for a PIR scheme is the maximum value (across all random realizations of queries) of the total number of M -ary symbols downloaded by the user from all the databases.
Our goal is to characterize the optimal (minimum over all PIR schemes) download cost D L , for arbitrary fixed message size L. The optimality is across all PIR schemes, i.e., including non-linear PIR schemes.
III. RESULTS

A. Optimal Download Cost for Matching Alphabet (M = M )
Consider the setting where the messages and downloads are comprised of symbols from the same alphabet, i.e., M = M ∈ N/{1}. Our main result for this setting appears in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: For PIR with N ∈ N databases, each storing all K ∈ N messages, each message comprised of L ∈ N symbols from M-ary alphabet, M ∈ N/{1}, where the downloads are comprised of symbols from the same M-ary alphabet, the optimal download cost is D L = L C M-ary symbols. The proof of converse (i.e., the impossibility claim) of Theorem 1 follows from the capacity result of [20] and appears in Section IV. The achievability is proved, first for the case L = N K −1 in Section V, and then for arbitrary L in Section VI.
Based on Theorem 1, the following observations are in order.
1) Given the message size and alphabet constraints, since the minimum download cost corresponds to the maximum rate, Theorem 1 equivalently characterizes the optimal rate for arbitrary message size in the matching alphabet case, as L/ L C . 2) Reference [11] shows that when K ≥ 2 and N ≥ L + 1, then the optimal download is D L = L + 1. This result can be recovered as a special case of Theorem 1 by noting that when K ≥ 2 and
where (8) follows because 0
Theorem 1 completes the picture by characterizing the optimal download cost for all N, K , L. 3) Reference [20] presents a PIR scheme which achieves a rate equal to capacity C if L = n N K where n ∈ N is any positive integer, so that the corresponding download is D = L C . This result can be recovered as a special case of Theorem 1 by noting that when
A naive extension of the PIR scheme of [20] to the setting when L is not an integer multiple of N K , is obtained by padding zeros to each message so that the message lengths are rounded up to the closest integer multiple of N K . The gap between the download cost of the naive scheme and the optimal download cost in Theorem 1 can be unbounded. For an example, if L = N K −1 , then the download cost of the naive scheme is
In the absence of any constraints on message lengths, we know from [20] that the maximum achievable rate across all PIR schemes is the capacity C. For constrained message length L, Theorem 1 shows that the maximum
C which is in general less than C. The message length L = N K −1 is particularly significant in light of Theorem 1, because this is the shortest message length for which the achieved rate equals the capacity C. This is seen as follows.
In order to achieve the capacity, the download cost must
because N K −1 and 1 + N + · · · + N K −1 are co-prime. This is verified, e.g., through Bezout's identity,
Now consider PIR schemes with mismatched alphabet, i.e., the messages are represented in M-ary alphabet, and the downloaded symbols are in M -ary alphabet, M = M. For this setting the optimal download cost to within 2 symbols is characterized in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: For PIR with N ∈ N databases, each storing all K ∈ N messages, each message comprised of L ∈ N symbols from M-ary alphabet, M ∈ N/{1}, where the downloads are comprised of symbols from M -ary alphabet,
The proof of Theorem 2 appears in Section VII.
The following observations place Theorem 2 in perspective.
1) The proof of Theorem 2 presented in Section VII shows that the download cost
is always achievable, and the download cost for any PIR scheme cannot be less than
. Therefore, in particular, when
2) It is easy to create examples where mismatched alphabet leads to less efficient PIR schemes than possible with matched alphabets. However, this is not always the case. The following examples show how mismatched alphabet can in some cases be beneficial in terms of rate relative to matched alphabet.
L L/C = 3/5 < C whereas the rate achieved with the mis-
Similarly one can construct examples with M > M where mismatched alphabet produces a higher rate than the best possible with matched alphabet, e.g., N = 2, K = 2, L = 3, M = 4 where the best rate with matched alphabet is again 3/5 < C, but the mismatched alphabet M = 8 achieves rate 2/3 = C.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1: CONVERSE
The converse for Theorem 1 is the impossibility claim, i.e., that no PIR scheme with matched alphabet
. This is proved as follows.
The message realizations are arbitrary, as is the choice of the desired message index θ ∈ [1 : K ]. By arbitrary, what is meant is that all realizations are possible. Therefore the PIR scheme must work for every possible realization of message symbols and θ . Any PIR scheme that works for arbitrary realizations, will also work if they are uniformly randomly generated. Therefore, for the converse argument let us assume uniform distributions on the realizations of message symbols, and on θ . The advantage of assigning a distribution to these arbitrary quantities is that we are able to use the information theoretic formulation of the PIR problem as in [20] , and the upper bounds on rate that are derived in [20] are also applicable in our current setting. In particular, C is still an upper bound on the achievable rate of a PIR scheme with arbitrary message realizations and θ and arbitrary message length L. Since capacity is an upper bound on the rate of
In [20] , it is shown that the capacity (and the corresponding optimal download cost) of PIR is achievable when L = N K bits. Here we present a more efficient PIR scheme to show that a smaller message size, L = N K −1 bits (M-ary symbols in general), is sufficient to achieve a rate equal to C (and the optimal download cost) when the alphabets are matched, i.e., M = M . This PIR scheme is significant because (as noted in Observation 5, Section III-A) L = N K −1 is the smallest message size needed to achieve capacity, and also because it is the key ingredient that will allow us to subsequently expand the achievability proof to arbitrary L in Section VI. Note that since the N = 1 case is trivial (optimal to download all messages), we will consider only N ≥ 2 in this section.
The PIR scheme that we present here is closely related to the capacity achieving PIR scheme presented in [20] . For both schemes the queries are comprised only of sums of symbols from various messages. Since our new scheme considers M-ary alphabet, the "sums" are interpreted as modulo-M sums. In both schemes no symbol appears more than once in the query for any particular database. The difference between the two schemes lies in the requirement of symmetry across databases. Recall that the PIR scheme of [20] is based on the iterative application of three steps corresponding to symmetry across databases, symmetry across messages within the query to each database, and exploiting side information. The key to reducing the message size from L = N K to L = N K −1 is to eliminate the requirement of symmetry across databases. Therefore, the new PIR scheme for L = N K −1 , formalized in the Q-Gen Algorithm in Section V-D, is based on the iterative application of the following two steps.
(
1) Enforcing Message Symmetry within the Queries to Each Database:
The goal is to make the queries to a database symmetric with respect to messages. combinations of 3 messages. Message symmetry is defined formally in Section V-B. The procedure is formalized in the M-Sym Algorithm, presented in Section V-C. All the queries that do not involve desired message symbols (I terms in the Q-Gen Algorithm) are introduced only through the M-Sym algorithm.
(2) Exploiting Side Information: The goal of this step is to exploit queries from other databases that were added to enforce message symmetry (and do not contain desired message symbols), as side information to construct new queries which are sums of symbols from desired message and the side information available from other databases. This step is formalized in the Exploit-SI Algorithm, presented in Section V-C. Except for an initialization step, all the queries involving desired message symbols (M terms in the Q-Gen Algorithm) are introduced only through the Exploit-SI algorithm. Let us start with a few simple examples for small K , N values to illustrate the key ideas.
A. Examples
represent an independent random permutation of L = 2 symbols from W 2 . The key to the privacy of the scheme is that these random permutations are generated privately by the user and are unknown to the databases.
Suppose the desired message is W 1 , i.e., θ = 1. The PIR scheme always starts by requesting the first desired symbol (in this case, a 1 ) from the first database (DB1). Applying
Step (1), we achieve message symmetry by including b 1 from DB1. Next we apply Step (2) to exploit the side information available at DB1, i.e., b 1 , in order to retrieve a new desired symbol a 2 from the second database (DB2) by mixing it with b 1 . At this point the query to each database is symmetric, and there is no side information that remains unexploited. Thus the construction is complete.
Similarly, the queries for θ = 2 are constructed as follows.
Note that the application of
Step (1) only introduces new terms that do not involve symbols from the desired message, whereas the application of
Step (2) are random permutations of two symbols from W 2 . These permutations are known only to the user, and not to the databases. Therefore, regardless of whether θ = 1 or θ = 2, DB1 is asked for one randomly chosen symbol of each message, and DB2 is asked for a sum of a pair of randomly chosen symbols from each message. Since the permutations are uniform, all possible realizations are equally likely, and privacy is guaranteed. A formal proof of privacy for the general setting appears in Section V-F.
The scheme is correct, because each desired message symbol is either downloaded directly or as a sum with side information terms that are separately downloaded.
Finally, note that the download cost is 4 ] are random permutations of 4 M-ary symbols each from messages W 2 , W 3 , respectively. The uniformly random and independent permutations are generated privately by the user. Suppose θ = 1. The query generation algorithm proceeds as follows.
Again, note that the application of
Step (2) only introduces new terms that involve symbols from the desired message. The queries generated when θ = 2, 3 are as follows.
Correctness is straightforward, privacy is ensured by message symmetry and random permutations, and the rate is L/D = 4/7 which matches the capacity C for this case. The download achieved is D = 4 symbols which is also optimal. 
Step (1) only introduces new terms that do not involve symbols from the desired message, whereas the application of Step (2) only introduces new terms that involve symbols from the desired message. The scheme when θ = 2, 3 is as follows.
Correctness is straightforward, privacy is ensured by message symmetry and random permutations, and the rate is L/D = 9/13 which matches the capacity C for this case. The download achieved is D = 13 symbols which is also optimal.
Next we go beyond the simple examples to the general N, K setting. Let us start by introducing some new definitions and notation, some of which is needed only to suppress those aspects of the general setting that are notationally cumbersome but otherwise inconsequential.
B. Definitions and Additional Notation
2 The U k symbols will eventually be mapped to random permutations of message W k symbols. We use
as in the examples, because while the latter notation is more clear, it does not generalize to K messages.
2) k-Sums, Types:
We use the terminology k-sum to denote an expression representing the sum of k distinct variables, each drawn from a different U i tuple, i.e.,
Furthermore, we will define such a k-sum to be of type {i 1 , i 2 , · · · , i k }, or i [1:k] in our compact notation. If q represents a k-sum, the function type(q) returns its type. Denote T k as the set of all possible types of a k-sum, i.e., all possible choices of k distinct indices in
The next two items are introduced to facilitate a compact notation. The first of these is a function, new(·), which will allow us to suppress unimportant details about symbol indices.
3) The new(·) Function: For any ordered tuple U , let new(U ) be a function that, starting with U (1), returns the "next" element in U each time 3 it is called with the same tuple U as its argument. So, for example, the following sequence of calls to this function:
as the output.
4) Ordered Access to Elements of a Set:
In a similar spirit, for any set A, when accessing its elements (e.g., in an algorithm), we will use the notation − → A to indicate that the elements of A are to be accessed in some specified order, the details of which are not significant, because all ordering rules will produce (possibly different) optimal PIR schemes. Let us assume by default that the ordering is the natural lexicographic increasing order. For example, − −−− → [1 : K ] refers to increasing order of integers 1 through K .
− → T k denotes that the types, i.e., the {i 1 , i 2 , · · · , i k } terms in T k are individually sorted and then accessed in lexicographic increasing order. For a set Q that is comprised of various k-sums the notation − → Q represents that the order in which the elements are accessed is, first in increasing order of k, then within the same k in increasing order of type, and then for multiple instances of the same type the elements are accessed in increasing order of the j index of the U i ( j ) with the smallest i . Some examples of this notation:
5) The Count(·) and Max(·) Functions
Max(Q, k) denotes the maximum of the number of k-sums of the same type in Q, with the maximization being across all types of k-sums,
6) Message Symmetry: Message symmetry is defined as the condition that ∀k ∈ [1 : K ], Q contains equal number of k-sums for every type {i 1 
C. Two Subroutines
For the sake of clarity, here we separately present the two procedures needed to implement the message symmetry and side information exploitation steps, which will ultimately be incorporated into the overall query generation algorithm.
1) Algorithm (1): Achieving Message Symmetry (M-Sym Algorithm):
The algorithm takes as input a set Q comprised of various k-sums, and produces as output a set Q * comprised of additional terms that need to be included in Q to make it message symmetric, i.e., Q ∪ Q * satisfies message symmetry. 
end for (i) Note that Q∪ Q * satisfies message symmetry because for all types i [1:k] 
To illustrate the M-Sym Algorithm, let us revisit the examples presented earlier in Section V-A. In all three examples, when invoking
Step (1), we run the M-Sym Algorithm once for each database. For example, consider the third example with K = 3 messages, N = 3 databases, and desired message index θ = 1. When we invoke Step (1) for the second time, consider DB2. The input to the M-Sym Algorithm is Q = {a 2 + b 1 , a 3 + c 1 }, which is not yet symmetric, and the output of the M-Sym Algorithm is Q * = {b 2 + c 2 }, whose union with Q is now symmetric. The symmetry of the messages is important to prove the privacy of the PIR scheme (see Lemma 3).
2) Algorithm (2):
Exploiting Side Information (Exploit-SI Algorithm): Algorithm (2) formalizes the side information exploitation step. This algorithm takes as input N query sets Q 1 , Q 2 , · · · , Q N , which are comprised of side information terms, i.e., terms that do not contain any desired message symbols, i.e., ∀n ∈ [1 : N] and ∀q ∈ Q n , θ / ∈ type(q) and which have not previously been exploited. The algorithm produces
with a "new" variable U θ (which corresponds to a desired message symbol).
Algorithm (2)
Initialize: All output are initialized as null sets. 4: for n = 1 : N do 5: for n = 1 : N and n = n do 6: for each q ∈ − → Q n do 7:
end for (q) 9: end for (n ) 10: end for (n)
To illustrate the Exploit-SI Algorithm, let us revisit the examples presented earlier in Section V-A. In all three examples, when invoking Step (2), we run the Exploit-SI Algorithm once. For example, consider the third example with K = 3 messages, N = 3 databases and desired message index θ = 1. When we invoke Step (2) for the second time, the input to the Exploit-SI Algorithm is Q 1 = {∅},
and the output of the Exploit-SI Algorithm is Q 1 = {a 6 +b 2 + c 2 ,
where each side information symbol from other databases is used to retrieve a new desired symbol. The exploitation of side information is important for the efficiency of the PIR scheme such that the rate achieved matches the capacity (see Lemma 2) .
D. A Deterministic Query Generation Algorithm (Q-Gen Algorithm)
We now proceed to a query generation algorithm. 4 The algorithm produces N query sets Q(DB, θ), for all DB ∈ [1 : N] as functions of θ . For internal book-keeping in the algorithm, we will partition each query set into K subsets called blocks, such that block k ∈ [1 : K ] contains only k-sums. Further we will partition each block into two subsets denoted by I and M such that the M partition contains only those types of k-sums which involve variables from U θ , and 4 Note that this is not the final step in the query generation. The output of this deterministic algorithm is in terms of the U k variables. The final step, to be presented in Section V-E, maps U k variables to private random permutations of W k variables, to produce the random queries that are then sent to the databases.
the I partition contains the remaining k-sums which do not involve the U θ variables.
As in the simple examples presented earlier, for all DB ∈ [1 : N], θ ∈ [1 : K ], the query sets Q(DB, θ) are built starting only from a single element in Q (1, θ) , which is the first desired message symbol U θ , and then evolves through iterative application of the M-Sym and Exploit-SI sub-routines. Note that the memory of calls to the new(·) function is assumed to be global, i.e., the memory is not reset when the sub-routines are called. Similarly, θ is assumed to be available to the subroutines as a global variable. 
Algorithm (3) Q-Gen
13: end for (DB) To illustrate the Q-Gen Algorithm, let us revisit the examples presented earlier in Section V-A. Consider the third example with K = 3 messages, N = 3 databases and desired message index θ = 1. For Block = 1, the queries for DB1 are generated as Q(1, θ, Block, M) = {a 1 }, Q(1, θ, Block, I) = {b 1 , c 1 }. For Block = 2 and Block = 3, we first exploit side information to retrieve more desired symbols, and then make the queries to each database symmetric to restore the privacy. We end at Block 3 because all side information is used and the queries to each database satisfy symmetry.
Based on Algorithm (3), we have two immediate observations. 1) Consider the number of instances with type 
2) From Step 4 and Step 8 of Algorithm (3), we know that 
and (16) reduces to
Combined with the fact that Max (Q(1, θ) ,
Step 4 of Algorithm (3) 
According to Lemma 1 the query sets Q(DB, θ) are comprised of K blocks, the k-th block contains v(DB, θ) instances of every possible type of k-sum, and no U i ( j ) variable appears more than once in Q(DB, θ). Therefore, the structure of the query set may be summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 1: Given DB, θ, for every U k , k ∈ [1 : K ], there exists its permutation U k that depends only on DB, θ, k,
such that Q(DB, θ) can be expressed as
Remark: As an example, consider the example with K = 3, N = 3, L = 9 that was presented earlier in Section V-A. Suppose DB = 2, θ = 3. The query Q(DB, θ) = Q(2, 3) is reproduced as follows.
which can be equivalently written in the form in Corollary 1 by setting a 1 , a 3 , a 4 , a 5 , a 6 , a 7 , a 8 , a 9 ) c 3 , c 8 , c 1 , c 4 , c 5 , c 6 , c 7 , c 9 ) (24)
Note that here
E. Mapping to Message Symbols to Produce Q [θ]
DB
To produce the actual query sent to the databases, we map the U k (i ) variables to message symbols. This mapping is specified by K privately chosen permutations γ 1 , γ 2 γ 1 (2)), W 3 (γ 3 (4) ) + W 5 (γ 5 (6))}. After this random mapping is applied to Q (DB, θ) , we obtain the actual query set Q [θ] DB that is sent to database DB. Q
We use the double-quotes notation around a symbol to represent the query about its realization. For example, while W 1 (1) is the realization of one message symbol, in our notation "W 1 (1)" only represents the question: "what is the value of
DB is a (unordered) set and the questions in the set are sent in an order that is independent of θ (say, uniformly random) to the databases.
F. Proof of Correctness, Privacy and Optimality
We prove that the achievable scheme is correct, private and optimal in the following two lemmas.
Lemma 2: The PIR scheme constructed through the Q-Gen Algorithm is correct, i.e., it satisfies (3). The message size is
Proof: Note that all desired message symbols are either retrieved directly with no interference or they appear with interference q that is downloaded separately from another database so it can be subtracted to retrieve the desired symbols. Therefore, all the desired message symbols are retrievable and the correctness constraint (3) is satisfied.
In order to compute the message size and download cost, we proceed as follows. Using (19), we have
Now we know that the number of instances of each type over each block is the same for databases 2 to N. Next we derive the total number of instances of each type over each block across all databases. For all k ∈ [2 : K ],
From Lemma 1, we have shown that there are
Note that desired variables all appear through new(U θ ) so that they are distinct across databases. Thus the message size (the total number of desired symbols that are retrieved) is
We next compute the download cost and show that the achieved download cost is optimal, i.e., D = 
The PIR scheme constructed through the Q-Gen Algorithm is private, i.e., it satisfies (4).
Proof: From Corollary 1, we know that Q(DB, θ) depends on θ only through the permutation functions
Because any permutation of a uniform permutation is also uniform,
Furthermore, because (4) is satisfied and the scheme is private.
Remark: The query size of the PIR scheme to database DB is equal to the size of the description for the permutation in
. Note that we do not attempt to optimize the upload cost in this paper, which is possible, as shown in [20] .
Remark: In all PIR schemes presented in this paper, we assume that each database stores all K messages. So the total storage required across all N databases is equal to K N times the message size.
VI. PROOF OF THEOREM 1: ACHIEVABILITY
FOR ARBITRARY L The optimal PIR scheme is a combination (analogous to time sharing arguments in channel capacity studies) of the capacity achieving scheme with message size L = N K −1 that was presented in the previous section, and a PIR scheme from [11] (see the remark on replicated storage above Section V of [11] ) which is related to blind interference alignment as noted in [21] (see the discussion section of [21] ). Since the main objective of [11] is PIR with distributed storage, the scheme that we need is recovered as an implicit special case of [11] (when replication coding is used across the databases). To make the scheme explicit, we restate this result in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 [11] : For PIR with N ≥ 2 databases, each storing K ∈ N messages, each message comprised of L = N − 1 symbols from M-ary alphabet, M ∈ N/{1}, where the downloads are comprised of symbols from the same M-ary alphabet, the download cost D = N = L + 1 M-ary symbols is achievable.
While the scheme is implicitly contained in [11] , for the sake of completeness we give an explicit proof of Theorem 3 in Section VI-E. We also note that the binary alphabet (M = 2) case is considered recently in [17] (see [ 
17, Construction 1]).
A. Examples
To convey the main ideas let us start with some examples for small values of K , N, L. The idea of constructing the optimal achievable scheme is to greedily use the most efficient PIR scheme (the capacity achieving scheme) repeatedly, and when the number of remaining symbols per message is less than required, we turn to the next most efficient scheme (the scheme in Theorem 3), and continue to use the scheme in Theorem 3 with possibly smaller and smaller message sizes until all symbols are considered. For the first group, we use the capacity achieving scheme with message length N K −1 = 2 so that the download cost achieved is 2/C = 3 symbols. For the second group, we use the scheme described in Theorem 3 so that the download cost achieved is N = 2 symbols. Adding the two, the overall download cost is D = 5 symbols, as desired.
2) K = 3 Messages, N = 3 Databases, L = 25 Symbols per Message: We show that the download cost D = L C = 25/(9/13) = 37 symbols is achievable. The scheme is as follows. For each message, divide the L = 25 symbols into three groups, where the first group is comprised of 18 symbols, the second group is comprised of 6 symbols and the third group is comprised of 1 symbol. For the first group, we further divide the 18 symbols to 2 sub-groups, each of which is comprised of 9 symbols. For each sub-group, we use the capacity achieving scheme with message length N K −1 = 9 so that the download cost achieved per sub-group is 9/C = 13 symbols. In total, the download cost for the first group is 26 symbols. Note that the second group only has 6 symbols per message so that we can not use the capacity achieving scheme and we turn to the scheme in Theorem 3. For the second group, we further divide the 6 symbols to 3 sub-groups, each of which is comprised of 2 symbols. For each sub-group, we use the scheme described in Theorem 3 with N = 3 databases, so that the download cost per sub-group is N = 3 symbols. In total, the download cost for the second group is 9 symbols. Note now that the third group only has 1 symbol per message so that even the scheme for the second group does not apply and we turn to the same class of scheme but with shorter (matching) message length. For the third group, we use the scheme described in Theorem 3 with N = 2 databases (say, the first two databases) and message size L = 1 symbol (matching the size of the third group), so that the download cost achieved is N = 2 symbols. Adding the download cost of the three groups up, the overall download cost is D = 26 + 9 + 2 = 37 symbols, as desired.
B. Description of Achievable Scheme for Arbitrary L
We now describe the general achievable scheme for arbitrary L, following the examples presented above. We first fully use the capacity achieving scheme with message size N K −1 .
To this end, we view each N K −1 symbols as a group and proceed until the number of symbols that remain is smaller
where
Otherwise, for the L 1 symbols that remain, we fully use the scheme in Theorem 3 with N databases and message size N − 1. We view each N − 1 symbols as a group and proceed until the number of symbols left is smaller than N − 1,
If L 2 = 0, we are done. Otherwise, for the L 2 ≥ 1 symbols that are left, we use the scheme in Theorem 3 with L 2 + 1 databases (say, the first L 2 + 1 ≤ N − 1 databases) and message size L 2 . Therefore the message size and the achievable download cost are
This completes the description of our achievable scheme.
Remark 
C. Proof That the Scheme Is Correct and Private
Since we construct our PIR scheme as a concatenation of multiple PIR schemes, let us present the following theorem to show that such a concatenation yields a PIR scheme that is correct and private. Proof: The scheme is based on dividing the L message symbols to J groups so that the j -th group is comprised of L j symbols per message. Then we use the given scheme with message length L j for the j -th group, so that the download cost achieved is D j symbols. Specifically, the queries for each group are generated independently, given the same desired message index. Combining the download cost for all J groups, we achieve the desired download cost. We are left to prove that this symbol sharing scheme produces a correct and private PIR scheme.
Correctness is easy to see as the scheme for each group is correct. Privacy is proved as follows. Consider any database n, n ∈ [1 : N] and any desired message index θ, θ ∈ [1 : K ]. Denote the query of the scheme for the j -th group as Q [θ] n ( j ). Since the scheme for the j -th group is private, we have that Q
. Now since for any θ , the queries for each group are generated independently, their joint probability distribution function is the product of the marginal probability distribution functions, i.e.,
for all θ, θ ∈ [1 : K ]. Therefore the overall query for all groups is identically distributed regardless of the index of the desired message θ , and the symbol sharing scheme is private (4).
D. Proof That the Achieved Download Cost D = L C
We next show that the achievable download cost in 
When N = 1, we have G 2 = 0 so that (46) holds. When N ≥ 2, plugging in
, we have
which is proved as follows
Thus the proof is complete.
E. Proof of Theorem 3
We now present the scheme with download cost D = N and message length L = N − 1. Consider
The queries are specified as follows. To retrieve W θ privately, the user first generates a random vector of
, where each element is uniformly distributed over {0, 1}. Then the queries are set as follows.
where ⊕ represents the modulo-2 sum. The answer from each database is the modulo-M sum of the scalar product of each message symbol and the corresponding coefficient in the query vector.
A
[θ] i+1 , with no error. Therefore, the PIR scheme is correct. Privacy is guaranteed because each query is independent of the desired message index θ . This is because regardless of the desired message index θ , each query Q [θ] n , ∀n is individually comprised of elements that are i.i.d. uniform over {0, 1}.
Each answer is comprised of 1 symbol, so the download cost achieved is D = N symbols. The proof is complete.
VII. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
A. Converse
First let us prove the converse. As in the converse proof of Theorem 1, the PIR capacity [20] provides a general upper bound on rate, and therefore a general lower bound on download cost for any given message length, which holds regardless of the choice of alphabet used to represent the messages and download symbols. For message length L and download cost D, the rate is 
B. Achievability For the proof of achievability, let us construct a simple (sub-optimal) PIR scheme whose download cost is nonetheless guaranteed to be within 2 M -ary symbols of the lower bound. The scheme is described as follows.
Let us map the messages from M-ary alphabet to M -ary alphabet. Each message is comprised of L symbols that are from an M-ary message alphabet, i.e., for each message there are M L possible distinct realizations. L symbols from M -ary alphabet are capable of representing M L distinct realizations. To have distinct representations for distinct message realizations, we must have
is sufficient. 5 Now the message symbols and the download symbols are from the same M -ary alphabet, so that we can use the PIR scheme used to establish achievability in Theorem 1 to achieve download cost D = L C , measured in M -ary download symbols. Next let us prove that even for this simple scheme, the gap to optimality is no more than 2 M -ary symbols.
Since the N = 1 case is trivial (optimal to fully download all messages), let us assume N ≥ 2. Note that for N ≥ 2 it is always true that C ≥ 1/2, i.e., 1/C ≤ 2. Starting with the general upper bound (57),
VIII. CONCLUSION Recent work has characterized the capacity, C (supremum of the ratio of message size over download cost, i.e., L/D) of PIR when the message size L → ∞. In this work, we have shown that for arbitrary fixed message size L ∈ N, when the messages and downloads are comprised of symbols from 5 The sub-optimality of the scheme becomes obvious here because, for example if M is much larger than M, then we could jointly code all K M-ary messages symbols to only 1 M -ary message symbol, therefore download cost of 1 M -ary symbol would be enough, whereas our naive scheme will download at least 1/C symbols. the same arbitrary M-ary alphabet, the optimal download cost is D L = L C ; and when the messages and downloads are comprised of symbols from different alphabets (messages from M-ary alphabet and downloads from M -ary alphabet, M = M ), the optimal download cost (in
An interesting feature of our PIR scheme is that it allows arbitrary M-ary alphabet (not restricted to finite fields). This is because the scheme downloads only direct sums modulo-M of various message symbols. As the next step in this direction the extension to TPIR (PIR with T -privacy) may be of interest. The capacity of TPIR for unconstrained alphabet is characterized in [22] , and the capacity achieving scheme presented there relies on finite field operations (multiplications) and existence of MDS codes. PIR schemes based on finite fields can be extended to arbitrary M-ary alphabet by decomposing M into its prime factors and concatenating PIR schemes over the finite fields corresponding to the prime factors. However, the extension may be difficult when field size constraints imposed by arbitrary M-ary alphabet are incompatible with the MDS code requirements.
